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--Providing for the common defense .. has been a goal of the United States 
since its founding.' The federal government and Congress, as charged with the duty 
to protect the citizens of the United States, has the constitutional authority to do all 
things that are --necessary and proper .. to carTy out their legislative duties.2 The 
Executive is charged with the duty to --faithfully execute the Office of President;· and 
--preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States of Arnerica:·3 The 
development of new technologies over the nation· s history has expanded the 
definition of what it takes to secure the homeland and provide for the common 
defense. The mobility of citizens from all over the world through air travel and the 
international shipping of goods by air freight and ports present the United States with 
new challenges in protecting both citizens and infrastructure. The events of 
1 U. S. Constitution. Preamble. 
2 U.S. Constitution. art. I. sec. 8. 
1 U .. Constitulion. art. 2. sec. I. 
September 11 th changed the way American policy makers conceive of the security 
environment within the United States. The "War on Terror" has no end in sight. 
The tools needed to secure the nation's ports and airways have become 
increasingly more complex. According to Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the growing interconnectedness between countries has the 
potential to raise the level of prosperity for people around the world, but with it 
comes leverage for terrorists and transnational criminals.4 Chertoff stated, "The 
ocean is no longer a protective device; the twenty-first century has made these 
obstacles very small. "5 Both maritime and aviation security are now more 
demanding than ever. However, there is much debate about whether the restructured 
aviation and maritime security measures are living up to their ilew demands. 
After the terrorist attacks of9/l l, both aviation and maritime homeland 
security were restructured and placed within the Department of Homeland Security. 
Maritime homeland security evolved from a program formerly know as Port Security 
which corresponded to the Cold War effort to secure U.S. ports and port facilities 
from threats presented by the Soviet bloc. 6 The revised Maritime Homeland Security 
program is focused almost solely on the prevention of terrorist attacks.7 The federal 
takeover of the former private aviation security sector in the aftermath of9/l l 
4Mary Kate Nevin, "Global Futures, Global Risks," World Policy Journal, (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.creativeleadershipsummit.org/?g~node/730. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Robert F. Bennett, "Close the Gaps," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 133, (Aug. 2007): 42-46. 
http://www.ebscohost.com 
7 Ibid. 
resulted in the creation of the Transportation Security Administration.8 Security 
procedures formerly controlled by the Federal Aviation Administration and 
Transportation Security Administration are now located within the Department of 
Homeland Security. 9 These structural changes were part of the "most complicated 
restructuring of the federal government ever proposed," according to Donald F. 
Kettl.
10 
This was an attempt to combine the expertise that already existed within the 
federal government that was highly fragmented and compartmentalized. 11 
This study is a comparative case study with a qualitative content analysis. A 
comparative case study is a type of cumulative study that serves as a cross unit 
comparison that attempts to discover generalizations about commonalities reflecting a 
policy, process, program, or decision. 12 In order to provide an evaluation of current 
aviation and maritime security, its' constitutional foundations and organizational 
structures have been examined. To determine their constitutional foundations, 
executive orders, court rulings, and precedents were used to secure an understanding. 
Also, the employees, cost factors, and reporting lines have been used to examine the 
organizational structure and culture. 
Though major improvements have been made to security procedures within 
the United States, some major problems still exist. Also, I would argue that many of 
8 Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, D.C.: 




12Jason L. Jensen and Robert Rodgers, "Cumulating the Intellectual Gold of Case Study Research," 
Public Administration Review 61 (Mar.-Apr. 2001): 238. http://www.jstor.com. 
the security procedures have the impact of limi ting the civil liberties of American 
citizen instead of citizens of the world. According to Douglas J. Feith. to prevent 
another attack, U.S. policy can either .. change the way we live" or ··change the way 
they live:· 13 History how that during ti me of war it is possible for the rights of 
American citizens to be limited by the government, sometimes unnecessarily; 
Americans would be better served by efforts that reduce the rights of fo reign citizens 
where infringement is nece ary. For example. during the Civil War. President 
Lincoln suspended the writ o_(habeas c01pus despite objections from the Supreme 
Court.
14 
Final ly, the current organizational structure of the Depa1tment of Homeland 
Security ha not had the ucces that was intended. though some substantial progress 
has been realized. 
.... \ 
Accepted by: ~ W .- cti , Chair 
13 Douglas J. Feith. ··War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism:· 
ew York: HarperCollins Publishers (2009). 47-87. 
14 Will iam H. Rehnquist. All laws Bw One: Ch·il lihertie1 in Wartime (New York: Vintage Books. 
2008), 11 -25. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increasing threat of terrorism within the United States has made it 
necessary to change the way the federal government looks at and deals with security 
issues. The threat of terrorism that emerged with the attacks of September 11, 200 I is 
a "new war without national borders and without lines of battle." 1 
The "fear that terrorists may get hold of nuclear and biological weapons is not 
unfounded, and this has induced even states under the rule of law to have 
recourse to internal systems of security similar to those that once existed only 
in dictatorships; and yet, the feeling remains that all these precautions will 
never real!1 be enough; since a completely global control is neither possible or desirable." 
In an attempt to be proactive in preventing future terrorist attacks, Congress 
reorganized the nation's security apparatus. 3 This restructuring resulted in the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is the largest agency 
in existence.4 DHS is an executive agency with secretary structure as follows: 
'Joseph Ratzinger, "Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures," San Francisco: Ignatius Press (2006): 25-
25. 
2Ibid., 26. 
3 There may be parallel organizational changes associated with previous wars and conflicts. These are 
beyond the scope of this research, but they merit further research. 
4
Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, D.C.: 
CQ Press, 2007), 55-120. 
1 
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DHS was created as a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As a result, 
many existing government agencies were transferred to the new department. Table I 
outlines the agencies included within the Department of Homeland Security. 
5 Department of Homeland Security, "Organizational Chart," 















Table 1: DHS: What's in the Agency?6 
Border & Transportation Security 
• U.S. Customs Service 
• Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services 
• Federal Protective Service 
• Transportation Security Administration 
• Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
• Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service 
• Office for Domestic Preoaredness 
Emergency Preparedness & Response 
• Federal Emergency Management Agency 
• Strategic National Stockpile & the National Disaster Medical System 
• Nuclear Incident Response Team 
• Domestic Emergency Support Teams 
• National Domestic Preparedness Office 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
• Critical Infrastructures Office 
• Federal Computer Incident Response Center 
• National Communications System 
• National Infrastructure Protection Center 
• Energv Security and Assurance Program 
Science and Technology 
• Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Countermeasures Program 
• Environmental Measures Laboratory 
• National Biological Warfare Defense Analysis Center 
• Plum Island Animal Disease Center 
Citizenship and Immigration Services 
• Bureau ofCitizenshio and Immigration Services 
Coast Guard 
Secret Service 
The new Department of Homeland Security encompasses twenty-one already existing 
agencies; it includes five border patrol and transportation security departments, the 
Coast Guard, the Secret Service, citizenship and immigration services, and 
infrastructure protection. However, many agencies and departments were not 
included within the structure of DHS. The three leading U.S. intelligence agencies-
6 Kettl, "System Under Stress," 55-120. 
3 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-were not included in the new department, 
despite the fact that homeland security depends on the intelligence collected from 
these agencies. 7 
Two key agencies that were included in the new department after the 
reorganization are the Transportation Security Administration and Customs and 
Border Protection which are both responsible for securing and facilitating the nation's 
legitimate trade and travel from terrorist infiltration. The Transportation Security 
Administration is responsible for aviation security and Customs and Border 
Protection is responsible for maritime security measures. This thesis will examine the 
historical development of each agency and policy changes since 9/11; provide a 
comparative analysis of the two agencies and their common administrative 
challenges; and offer recommendations for further study and policy adoption. 
7 Ibid. 
4 
MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY 
Maritime Homeland Security evolved from a program formerly known as Port 
Security. Port security was first recognized as a national priority during World War I 
era when a series of explosions ripped through the waterfront at Black Tom Island in 
New Jersey on July 30, 1916.8 Later, the Port Security program "represented the 
Cold War effort to secure U.S. ports and port facilities from the Soviet bloc."9 The 
revised Maritime Homeland Security (MHS) program is focused almost solely on the 
prevention of terrorist attacks. 10 The challenge of securing U.S. Ports is vast. 
Consider the following statistics: 11 
• 90% of the world's cargo moves by ship 
• More than 11 million containers are offloaded at U.S. Ports every year 
• Almost half of the incoming U.S. trade arrives by ship 
• The U.S. has 361 seaports 
Three hundred and sixty one ports and 11 million containers constitute no small task. 
Of the 11 million containers that enter the country each year only about two-thirds 
were screened for radiological material as of 2006.12 However, cargo containers are 
not the only threat to the security of U.S. ports. Captain Robert Bennett of the U.S. 
Coast Guard notes that focusing solely on cargo is a mistake since several other 
8 Dennis L. Bryant, "Port Security: A Historical Perspective," Mari11eli11k.com, March 8, 2004, 
http://www.marinelink.com/News/Article/Column-Port-Security-A-Historical-
Perspective/323403.aspxf. 
9 Robert F. Bennett, "Close the Gaps," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 133, (Aug. 2007): 42-46. 
http://www.ebscohost.com 
10 Ibid. 
11Captain Ashley, "Container and Port Security: A Bilateral Perspective," The Illlernational Journal of 
Marine and Costa/ Law, (2003): 341-361. http://www.ebscohost.com. 




problems exist. 13 The division of responsibilities regarding MHS is also a potential 
problem due to a lack of communication between government agencies. The 
agencies charged with the key maritime security responsibilities are The Department 
of Homeland security (DHS), U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
and the Transportation Security Administration. 14 An attack on a major U.S. port 
could cause economic mayhem as well as mass death and infrastructure damage. 
Since 9/11, steps have been taken in order to combat the potential security 
weaknesses of U.S. ports. The two leading steps are the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act (MTSA) and the SAFE Port Act. 15 This chapter will examine the 
importance of maritime homeland security policy and changes since 9/11. 
Maritime Homeland Security was created as a response to the horrific attacks 
of September 11, 2001 in order to prevent a future attack of the same magnitude from 
occurring through the cargo containers shipped into the U.S. daily. Robert Bennett 
notes that "experts cite our abundant economy as one reason why the enemy hates us. 
Therefore, it must be protected. In view of their importance to our economy, our 
merchant marine partners in world commerce must not be viewed as criminals."16 
Bennett makes a valid point in the respect that the U.S. economy is a target of 
terrorists-evident in their attack on the World Trade Centers, but it would not seem 
that it is a reason our enemies hate us. The enemies of the U.S. attacked the World 
13 Bennett, "Close the Gaps," 42-46. 
14 
Stephen Caldwell, The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implememation One Year Later (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). http://www.ebscohost.com. 
15 Ibid. 
16Bennett, "Close the Gaps," 42-46. 
6 
Trade Centers as a symbolic act. Economic targets are relevant to the terrorists 
because they are important to Americans and cause physical destruction and financial 
mayhem, which are a terrorist's goal. Terrorists do not wish to occupy land, but 
instead to violently disrupt the lives of Americans by causing panic and fear. Since 
the shipping industry contributes to so much of the United States and world economy, 
an attack would hold similar strategic importance with that of the World Trade 
Centers. As a maritime attack is plausible, this is a very pertinent area of policy 
research. 
The key agency charged with the protection of America's borders from 
terrorism is the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Customs and 
Border Protection is located within the Department of Homeland Security and is 
charged with the duty to "protect our nation's borders from terrorism, human and 
drug smuggling, illegal ntigration, and agricultural pests while simultaneously 
facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade."17 CBP is responsible for 
guarding 7,000 ntiles of land border shared with Canada and Mexico, 2,000 miles of 
coastal waters around the Florida peninsula and Southern California, and 95,000 
ntiles of maritime border in partnership with the U.S. Coast Guard.18 The agency 
17 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ''This is CBP," 
http://cbp.gov/xp/gov/about/mission/cbp is.xml (accessed March 26, 20IO). 
18 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, ''This is CBP," Border Security, 
http://cbp.2ov/xp/gov/about/mission/cbp is.xml (accessed March 26, 20IO). 
7 
must process all people, vehicles, and cargo entering the U.S. while carrying out its 
priority anti-terrorism mission. 19 The following chart outlines the structure of CBP. 
Figure 2: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Organizational Structure20 
1 
Executive Director 
Office cf Diversitr 




/ \ Corrrnissinner 
~----, 
~ 
Oiief of staff 




Office of Pdicr and 
P!enning Oiief Counsel 
Direttor 
Office of Trade 
Relations 
v V 2-__ V fj v 
Assistant Chief i Assistant A=Comm"""" ;11""-"'mmlnloae, 51 AmCommln!oae, Commissicmr Offiteof Commissioner Wice oflntell end Office of Office of Office cf field Border Patrol Office of Air and , :>pera:ion_s ;
11
1n1ematlonal Affairs ~ lntematlona!Trede 
Opemtioni I Maine omt11nat10fl ■ , ~ 




Office of ~1 
Congrwional Affai~ 
Office of OffittcfH..R. fficeoflnfarmation~ 
Assttommlssloner 
Office of lnkrnal 
Affairs 
Asst COmmissioner I Asst. Commissioner I Asst Commissioner ;I 







. end Development ! 
For the first time in United States history, a single agency is responsible for border 
protection.21 CBP is the "unified border agency" within DHS; it combined U.S. 
Customs, U.S. Immigration, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the 
entire U.S. Border Patrol.22 Customs and Border Protection contains more than 
19 Ibid. 
20 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Organization," 
hllp://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/organization/orgchal .ctt/orgchal .pdf (accessed April 5, 2010). 
21 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism," 
hltp://cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/mission/cbp.xml (accessed March 26, 2010). 
22 Ibid. 
8 
41,000 employees to "manage, control and protect the Nation's borders, at and 
between the official ports of entry.23 
The threat to U.S. ports is real and the flaws in protection are endless. First, 
the intense focus on the specific port areas and not our entire coastline could be 
questioned. Secondly, despite the layers of security implemented for container 
shipments, ignoring other areas of security other than the container shipments is an 
extreme flaw leaving large gaps in security efforts. Other areas of concentration 
should be on mine warfare, threats from small seagoing vessels, and identifying 
private terminals of enemy interest. 24 Mine warfare is a substantial threat. An Iraqi 
mine laying operation that used a commercial seagoing tug and barge discovered by 
allied forces during the early stages of the Iraq War could be replicated along U.S. 
coastline. 25 The threat of small seagoing vessels is another important area of focus 
since small vessels are not subjected to the same notification and identification 
regulations as large ships. They pose the same level of threat because a weapon of 
mass destruction will fit onto a 60 foot boat as easily as a shipping container.26 Also, 
small vessels are not required to dock at the larger ports; they have the ability to 
navigate into much smaller coastal inlets and estuaries.27 Finally, a lack of focus on 
privately-owned terminals is a great threat. Private terminals often include chemical 
and petroleum waterfront facilities associated with bulk distribution which might be a 
23 Ibid. 





more fertile terrorist target than containerships filled with watertight steel boxes 
secured at state docks.28 Private sector terminals pose a threat to U.S. security, 
therefore, they should be afforded the same level of security as public facilities. 
According to Robert Bennett, our national policy is treating the war on 
terrorism as a law enforcement effort rather than a military campaign. 29 Instead of 
treating the enemy as a perpetrator that we will catch after a crime is committed, we 
should see them as non-uniformed combatants. Since law enforcement operations are 
reactive, prevention of a terrorist attack becomes much more difficult. Therefore, it is 
essential to pursue maritime security as a military operation, which tends to be a 
proactive measure that would neutralize the enemy before a terrorist act is committed. 
Weaknesses in port security are being dealt with through the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the SAFE Port Act.30 The Maritime 
Transportation Security Act amended the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (MMA).31 
The MMA was signed by President Roosevelt on June 30, 1936.32 It was created to 
"[t]o further the development and maintenance of an adequate and well-balanced 
American merchant marine, to promote the commerce of the United States, and to aid 
in the national defense."33 This Act created the United States Maritime Commission 
transferring "[a]Il the functions, powers, and duties vested in the former United States 
281bid., 42-46. 
""Ibid., 42-46. 
3°Caldwell, The SAFE Port Act. 
31Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 107th Cong. S. 1214. 25 Nov. 2002. 
<http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/MTSA.pdf>. 
32 
Ralph L. Dewey, "The Merchant Marine Act of 1936," American Economic Review 27, (June 1937): 
240. http://www.jstor.org. 
33 Merchant Marine Act of 1936, U.S. Code, vol. 27, sec. 101-907 (1936). 
Shipping Board by the Shipping Act, 1916, the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, the 
Merchant Marine Act, 1928, the Intracoastal Shipping Act, 1933, and amendments to 
those Acts," and that was then "vested in the Department of Commerce pursuant to 
section 12 of the President's Executive order of June 10, I 933," to the Commission.34 
The MTSA was enacted in November of 2002 to help protect ports and waterways 
from terrorist attacks by requiring a wide range of security improvements.35 Major 
requirements included in the MTSA are the development of security plans to mitigate 
identified risks for the national maritime system, conducting vulnerability 
assessments for port facilities and vessels, establishing a process to assess foreign 
ports, and the development of the Worker Identification Credential. 36 
The SAFE Port Act, enacted in October 2006, made several adjustments to 
programs within the port security framework, created and codified new programs and 
initiatives, and amended some of the original provisions of the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act.37 The SAFE Port Act contains three key areas: overall 
port security; security at individual facilities; and cargo container security. 38 Each of 
the three key areas contains several security programs. The key areas and programs 
are outlined below in Table 2. The programs marked with an asterisk are the most 
important with regard to securing United States ports and vessels from the risk of a 
terrorist attack. 
34 Ibid., sec. 204(a). 





T bl 2 S a e : ummaryo f3K A ey reas an d 19P rograms o fSAFEP ort A 39 ct 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
Overall Port Security 
Area Maritime Security Committees Committees of port stakeholders who share info 
& develoo securitv olans 
Interagency Operational Centers Command centers where agencies share 
information, coordinate activities and joint 
efforts 
*Port Security operations Activities to maintain security and deter attacks 
(boat oatrols) 
* Area Maritime Security Plans Plan laying out local port vulnerabilities, 
response actions and responsibilities 
Port Security Exercises Test the effectiveness of port security plans 
*Evaluations of security at foreign ports Coast Guard program where officers visit and 
assess securitv conditions at foreign oorts. 
Port Facility Security 
*Port facility security plans Include operational and physical security 
measures and procedures for responding to 
security threat 
*Port facility security compliance monitoring Coast Guard review of port facility security 
plans and compliance 
*Transportation Worker Identification Credential Biometric ID cards to be issued to port workers 
to help secure access to areas of ports 
*Background Checks OHS requirements for persons who enter secure 
or restricted areas or transoort hazardous cargo 
Container Security 
* Automated Targeting System Risk-based decision system to determine 
containers reouiring inspection 
Customs In-Bond System Allows goods to transit the U.S. without 
entering U.S. commerce 
*Container Security Initiative CPB officers at foreign ports to inspect high 
risk carJ>.o before it comes to U.S. 
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Partnership of CPB and private companies to 
imorove int'l securitv 
Promoting Global Standards Goal to standardize supply chain security 
*Megaports Initiative Radiation detection technology at foreign ports 
to stoo oroliferation of WMD 
*Secure Freight Initiative ContainerSecurity Initiative scanning combined 
with Megaports Initiative at forei!!II ports 
* 100 Percent Container Scanning at Foreign Ports Scanning by nonintrusive imaging and radiation 
detection equipment of all cargo containers at 
foreign oorts inbound to the U.S. bv 2012 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Research, development, testing,& evaluation of 
radiation detection equipment to prevent 




The programs of the SAFE Port Act are extensive, but limited in scope; most 
of the programs are focused on the threats of cargo containers and the immediate 
public port area. The most substantial program is the 100% Container Scanning at 
Foreign Ports by the year 2012. This is a beneficial way to be proactive against 
terrorism instead of waiting until a weapon of mass destruction is docked at a U.S. 
port. 
Maritime Homeland Security, formerly known as Port Security, is a daunting 
task. Though great strides have been made in areas relating to public port security 
and cargo container inspection, many weaknesses still exist. An attack could be 
orchestrated using smaller vessels not regulated by the SAFE Port Act or mines 
placed near ports. Maritime threats will continue as long as a significant portion of 
all U.S. trade arrives by ship. Eleven million containers, originating from 700 global 
ports, enter the U.S. at 361 different port locations within the U.S. Despite this, 
container security should not be the sole focus of maritime homeland security. The 
best way to deal with this threat is to be proactive by scanning all containers before 
they arrive on U.S. soil and focusing on the less visible weaknesses. This will help to 
ensure a Weapon of Mass Destruction is not detonated at a major United States port, 
which will generally be near a major city where the devastation to the city and its 
economy would be immense. According to Warren Rudman, Senator and co-chair of 
the U.S. Commission on National Security, perhaps the biggest failure of the 
Department of Homeland Security is the lack of progress in shoring up ports and it is 
13 
still the #1 unsolved problem.40 In sum, a significant amount of progress has been 
made toward improving maritime security, but the changes are not currently sufficient 
to guard against acts of terrorism while gaps in security procedures exist. 
~erry Kivlan, "Rudman Decries Department as 'Mess,' Urges Reorganization,'' CongressDaily AM, 
December 4, 2007, http://www.ebscohost.com. 
14 
A VIA TI ON HOMELAND SECURITY 
The aviation industry within the United States has proliferated since World War I 
when surplus aircrafts were converted for civilian commercial use.41 Air travel has 
become one of the most common forms of transportation due to its expediency. 
Passenger air traffic grew from 172 million in 1970 to nearly 642 million in a little 
over 30 years.42 With its enormous popularity and a primary means of public 
transportation thousands of people jam a terminal on any given day, presenting a 
particularly enticing target for terrorists. Airports are especially appealing because 
they are filled with people each and every day; move on a scheduled basis in 
predictable geographic locations; and are public facilities.43 According to Eben 
Kaplan, writer for the Council on Foreign Relations, "[t]here is a particular horror 
attached to transportation attacks because passengers are in effect helpless in a 
situation like that. In addition, the dramatic nature of airliner attacks attracts a vast 
amount of media attention and can help inspire fear in the populace-two major aims 
of most terrorist operations."44 The challenge in providing adequate physical, 
personnel, and operational security is substantial and should not be neglected.45 The 
types of potential threats are numerous. It can emanate from a terminal assault, a 
41 Kathleen M. Sweet, Aviation and Airport Security: Terrorism and Safety Concerns (Boca Raton, 
Fla.: CRC Press, 2009), 2. 
42 lbid., 4. 
43 Ibid., I 0. 
44 Eben Kaplan, "Targets for Terrorists: Post 9/11 Aviation Security," Council on Foreign Relations, 
September 7, 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication (accessed May I, 2009). 
45 Sweet, Aviation and Airport Security," 10. 
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hijacking, and the use of an aircraft as a weapon.46 The attacks of September 11, 
2001 are not the only instance of airline attacks to consider. As early as 1970, 
Palestinian terrorists hijacked several airliners forcing them to fly to the Jordanian 
desert and the aircrafts were destroyed in a fiery explosion.47 In 1985, fanatic 
Japanese terrorists, in support of the Palestinian cause, opened fire on airline 
passengers at the Vienna and Rome airports.48 As recently as 2002, a former 
Egyptian citizen living in California opened fire on passengers waiting in line at the 
El Al check-in counter.49 The continued use of airlines as a source of terrorist attacks 
demonstrates the need for heightened security measures in U.S. airports and airports 
around the world. Aviation security is a vital component of the United States' desire 
for complete defenses against terrorist attacks. This chapter will examine the 
important issues of aviation security and the laws and regulations being implemented. 
Transportation Security Administration policies are numerous and diverse, covering 
multiple levels of security, and are comprehensively more effective than critics 
suggest, despite some needed improvements. 
The development of new technologies throughout the nation's history has 
expanded the definition of what it takes to secure the homeland and provide for the 
common defense. The mobility of citizens from all over the world through air travel 
has presented the United States with new challenges in protecting both citizens and 
46 Ibid., 10. 
47 Ibid., 13. 
48 Ibid., 13. 
49 Ibid., 13. 
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infrastructure. Aviation security is an important part of the federal government's 
attempt to protect and defend the homeland. Aviation security has been changed 
drastically in our recent history, but it is unclear if the advances in security measures 
have been sufficient in reducing criminal and terrorist aviation threats. According to 
the literature, despite advances in aviation security, major downfalls still exist. 
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, airport security was governed by federal 
regulations that were implemented by private companies hired by individual 
airports.50 In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration proposed that 
stricter security measures be implemented, but that the airport security companies 
would remain privatized. 51 However, the Senate had a different idea. They thought 
that only a federal takeover of aviation security and personnel would eliminate the 
existing problems with the private system and reestablish citizen confidence in the 
aviation industry.52 
The resulting legislation created the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), located within the Department of Transportation, which was charged with the 
duty to hire airport screeners and enhance airline security.53 Even after the 
transportation security bill was passed, Democrats in Congress continued to argue for 
a full-scale department of homeland security.54 The Bush Administration later 
proposed that twenty-two federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities be 
50 Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, 
D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 49. 
51 Ibid., 49. 
52 Ibid., 50. 
53 Ibid., 50. 
54 Ibid., 50. 
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combined into a single new department, with secretary structure, and a budget that is 
subject to congressional approval. 55 The TSA was included as a part of the new 
Department of Homeland Security, while the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
remained part of the Department of Transportation. 56 
The TSA is responsible for the security of all of the nation's transportation 
systems and for ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce.57 Gale 
Rossides is the current Acting Administrator of the Transportation Security 
Administration and there are sixteen assistant administrators that work within specific 
sectors of TSA duties. 58 The TSA employs several types of officials in order to 
perform their required functions:59 
• Transportation Security Officers 
• Federal Air Marshals 
• Bomb Assessment Officers 
• Intelligence Analysts 
• Federal Flight Deck Officers 
• Canine Explosive Detection Teams 
The TSA also provides several security training programs to non-TSA employees in 
order to enhance the security and safety of all air travelers. One of the main programs 
falling within this category is training for all law enforcement officers who would like 
55 Ibid., 53. 
56 lbid., 54-55. 
57 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Who We Are," Transportation Security Administration, 
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/what_is_tsa.shtm (accesses March 6, 2009). 
58_U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Who We Are," Transportation Security Administration, 
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/people/index.shtm (accessed March 6, 2009). 
59 Ibid. 
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to remain armed while flying. 60 This is a mandatory program under Code of Federal 
Regulations 1544.219 which dictates the Carriage of Accessible Weapons.61 
The changes implemented since 9/11 are not sufficient according to some 
commentators. "Don't Sweat the TSA," was recently published by Fred Reed where 
he argues that there are several problems with security implemented by the TSA. 62 
He states that it is a problem that baggage is not inspected until it is already inside a 
crowded terminal; a busy airport is as good a target as a plane. 63 This is an often 
overlooked point. Anyone who has flown in the last few years can recognize this 
often overlooked gap in security. Also, it is widely know that if you buy a one way 
ticket you will be questioned by TSA security officers; however, it seems likely that 
any terrorist would then buy a roundtrip ticket in order to avoid being questioned.64 
More security downfalls were pointed out by Nicholas Stein in his article called 
"America's Time Bomb". According to Stein, "our nation's airport-security 
apparatus still suffers from the same weaknesses it did before the Twin Towers were 
toppled."65 He lists several reasons for support: 66 
I. Current screening methods cannot locate improvised explosive devices 
2. Outdated screening technology 
60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Law Enforcement Traveling With Guns," Transportation 
Security Administration, http://www. tsa.govflawenforcement/programs/traveling_ with_guns.shtm 
(accessed March 6, 2009). 
61lbid. 
62 Fred Reed, "Don't Sweat the TSA," The American Conservative, (May 2008): 35. 
http://www.amconmag.com/article/2008/may/l 9/00035 (accessed February 26, 2009). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Nicholas Stein, "America's Time Bomb," Best Life, (November 2008): 112-116. 
http://www.ebscohost.com (accessed March 9, 2009) 
66 lbid. 
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3. Chronic staff shortages 
4. Insufficient training for TSA screeners 
5. Sensitive areas are not secure 
6. No after-hours security 
7. No accountability 
8. Institutional TSA Cover-ups 
It is evident that critics of TSA policies and procedures have found several defects; 
however, the TSA seems confident in their abilities to protect the nation's airports. 
Further criticisms have been made by Gregory D. Kutz and John W. Cooney 
in their article "Aviation Security Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of 
TSA's Passenger Screening Process."67 They stated that GAO investigators 
succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with 
components for several improvised explosive devices concealed in their carry-on 
luggage and on their persons.68 However, it could be argued that these investigators 
know the detection systems better than a terrorist, making it easier for them to avoid 
detection. The system is, nevertheless, flawed in some fashion if these investigators 
can breach the security system undetected. The security checkpoints will be flawless 
when investigators who know the system cannot pass through undetected. Criticisms 
from Eben Kaplan state that focusing so heavily on passenger screening has left 
aircraft vulnerability in other areas, such as cargo security.69 TSA programs are 
continually updated and many of these security issues are being resolved. Though 
67 Gregory D. Kutz and John W. Cooney, "Aviation Security Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert 
Testing ofTSA's Passenger Screening Process," Council on Foreign Relations, November 15, 2007, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication (accessed May I, 2009). 
68 lbid 
69 Kaplan, "Targets for Terrorists." 
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critics of TSA policies are abundant, the TSA urges that covert testing of passenger 
screening is helping to alleviate many of the weaknesses.70 
While information regarding the development of aviation security is abundant, 
the literature is lacking in the quantity of evaluative studies measuring the success of 
current policies and procedures implemented by the TSA. The change in 
enforcement from the Federal Aviation Administration to the Transportation Security 
Administration was intended to improve security for citizens of the United States, but 
the literature is unclear regarding the effectiveness of the new department. It is also 
unclear what changes could potentially arise under the new Democratic Obama 
Administration, since he has currently failed to make any significant changes to TSA 
policies. 
Current aviation security policy developed over many years, but essentially 
began in 1971 after the success of Dan Cooper's hijacking of Northwest Orient Flight 
30571 , but proliferated after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.72 Cooper's inherent 
hijacking success in 1971 created a need to ensure the prevention of a similar 
occurrence. Early Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), after 1971, designed to 
ensure the security of airports serving scheduled air carriers were required to have 
screening programs and had the responsibility to prevent and deter carriage of 
70 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Covert Testing," Transportation Security Administration, 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/screening/covert_testing.shtm (accessed May 1, 2009). 
71 Sweet, "Aviation and Airport Security," 17. 
72 Kettl, "System Under Stress," 21. 
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weapons and explosives aboard aircraft by potential hijackers.73 Federal Aviation 
Regulations set the overall general guidelines for all security assets and procedures 
for airports within the U.S. and for U.S. and foreign airlines servicing U.S. airports.74 
Specifically, FAR Parts 107 and 108 required airport operators and airlines to issue a 
security program and Part 108.7 required 100 percent screening of all passengers and 
all carry-on items.75 Also, the amount of security originally required to deter 
hijacking was thought to be directly proportional to the size of the aircraft; this 
approach resulted in tighter security rules for larger passenger airplanes. 76 
FAR Part 121.538-mentioned above-became effective in January of 
1972.77 Due to public concern and a call for action, the amendment to Part 121-
requiring the implementation of screening systems to detect weapons and explosives 
in carry-on baggage and passengers-was hastily put into effect with only three days 
notice to the airlines.78 By the end of 1972, the increasing frequency of terrorist or 
criminal threats prompted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require at a 
minimum:79 
• Screening of all persons and carry-on baggage before entering an airport's 
departure area; 
• The availability of a sworn law enforcement officer at the screening point 
within a specific period of time; 
• Development by both scheduled airline carriers and airport managers of 
security programs approved by the FAA; and 
73 Sweet, "Aviation and Airport Security," 18. 
74 Ibid., 18. 
75 Ibid., 18. 
76 Ibid., 18. 
77 Ibid., 19. 
78 Ibid., 19. 
79 Ibid., 21. 
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• Development of an airport disaster plan. 
By 1974, a call for the strengthening of United States law relating to hijacking 
led to the creation of Public Law 93-366 which drastically changed the Federal 
Aviation Act of 1958.80 The international aspects of this legislation gave the 
President broad statutory authority to regulate international air operations; he could 
suspend foreign air commerce between the U.S. and any foreign carrier that continued 
air service between itself and a nation harboring terrorists.81 Though this broad 
regulatory power given to the president could have been a positive deterrence tool, it 
was more complicated and more difficult to enforce than it appeared. 82 
After another terrible accident in 1988, the bombing of Pan American Flight 
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, federal authorities were forced to re-examine the issue 
of threat warnings. 83 Just eight days after the bombing, the Federal Aviation 
Administration imposed new security measures on American airlines that fly out of 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East.84 These new regulations included X-raying or 
physically examining all checked baggage and increased screening of passengers.85 
The resulting report of the President's Commission on A via ti on Security and 
Terrorism, published May 15, 1990, provided more than 60 recommendations for 
80 Ibid., 24. 
81 Ibid., 24. 
82 Ibid., 24. 
83 Ibid., 24. 
84 "The Bombing of Pan Am Flight 103." Washington Post, 1999, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com. wp-srv/inatl/longterm/panaml 03/timeline.htm (accessed April 17, 
2009). 
85 McAllister, Bill, and Laura Parker," Security Rules Tightened for U.S. Airlines Abroad." 
Washington Post, 30 December 1980, AO!. http://www.washingtonpost.com.wp-
srv/inatl/longterm/panaml 03/stories/faal 23088.htm (accessed April 17, 2009). 
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improving airport and aircraft security procedures and concluded that the United 
States should pursue a more ·vigorous counterterrorism policy. 86 Recommendations 
included: 87 
• Management of security at domestic airports by the federal 
government; 
• Negotiations with foreign governments to permit U.S. carriers to 
comply with U.S. law overseas even when they conflict with local 
law; 
• Public notification of threats to civil aviation; 
• Research to improve technological means to prevent terrorism. 
Once agarn, such recommendations were good, but they proved difficult to 
implement. First, the United States does not have the authority to demand that 
overseas airports comply with U.S. laws; the art of diplomacy is required to ensure 
compliance and some nations are more easily convinced than others. 88 Also, public 
notification can cause panic. Finally, the issue of who determines whether a threat is 
real and who decides what action should be taken remains unresolved.89 The 
recommendations of the President's Committee on Aviation Security and Terrorism 
led to the Aviation Security Improvement Act of I 990 (ASI Act 1990). 90 
The ASI Act of 1990 established new offices and positions. Within the 
Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of Transportation the legislation 
created a Director of Intelligence and Security, numerous federal security manager 
positions authorized to implement security programs throughout the U.S., and an 
86 Sweet, "Aviation and Airport Security," 24. 
87 Ibid., 25. 
88 Ibid., 25. 
89 Ibid., 25. 
90 Ibid., 26. 
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assistant administrator of Civil Aviation Security.91 The Director of Intelligence and 
Security was responsible for coordination with appropriate federal agencies; 
development of policies and plans for dealing with threats; serving as the primary 
liaison of the Secretary with intelligence and law enforcement communities; and any 
and all other duties that may be necessary to ensure the security of the traveling 
public.92 The assistant administrator of Civil Aviation Security was responsible for 
the day-to-day management of the FAA field security resources.93 The 1990 
legislation also authorized the positioning of federal security managers at all Category 
X U.S. airports and liaison officers at designated airports outside the U.S. in order to 
coordinate security on a global basis.94 Finally, Section 105 of the legislation 
mandated background checks on airport and airline personnel and Section 107 
ordered a program to accelerate research and development and the rapid 
implementation of new technologies and procedures. 95 Following the tragic crash of 
TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, President Clinton created the White House 
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security; their report provided 20 specific 
recommendations for improving security.96 The Federal Aviation Reauthorization 
Act of 1996 was signed in October 1996 and focused in part on FAA certification of 
91 Ibid., 26. 
92 Ibid., 26. 
93 Ibid., 26. 
94 Ibid., 26. 
95 Ibid., 26. 
96 Federal Register, Vol. 65, No. 3, Jan. 5, 2000, Proposed Rules, pg. 562, 
hnp://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/register/2000/2000_562.pdf (accessed April 17, 2009). 
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security companies to improve the training and testing of security screeners through 
uniform performance standards. 97 
The Federal Aviation Administration was originally charged with the task of 
ensuring that airlines were implementing the proper security procedures. The FAA' s 
Civil Aviation Security (CSA) Division was tasked with keeping civil aviation safe 
from terrorist attacks.98 The office of the FAA Associate Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security developed and executed regulatory policies, programs, and 
procedures to prevent terrorist, criminal, and other disruptive acts against civil 
aviation.99 However, the FAA was no longer charged with these duties after the 
development of the Transportation Security Administration in response to the terrorist 
hijackings of September ll th . 100 The Federal Aviation Administration's Civil 
Aviation Security organization was integrated into the newly founded TSA. 101 The 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 was signed into law by 
President Bush and created the TSA within the Department of Transportation; 
however, the TSA was later transferred to be a part of the Department of Homeland 
Security .102 The ATSA put the federal government in charge of the monitoring and 
97Ibid., 562. 
98 Sweet, "Aviation and Airport Security," 28. 
99 Ibid., 28. 
100 Kettl, "System Under Stress," 50. 
101 Sweet, "Aviation and Airport Security," 29. 
102 Ibid., 28. 
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performance of transportation security. 103 The TSA was charged with the following 
general duties: 104 
• Screen all persons, baggage, and cargo; 
• Provide stress management conflict resolution programs; and 
• Implement policies for professional interaction with passengers. 
The TSA is comprised of 50,000 security officers, inspectors, directors, air marshals 
and managers who protect the nation's transportation systems-roadways, rail travel, 
and air travel. 105 The mission of the TSA is to "protect the Nation's transportation 
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce." 106 The TSA's 
organization structure is intended to provide optimal service and respond to changing 
needs. 107 
103 Ibid., 28. 
104 Ibid., 33. 
105 Department of Homeland Security, "Who We Are." 
106 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Mission, Vision, and Core Values," Transportation 
Security Administration, http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/mission.shtm (accessed April 17, 2009). 
107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Organizational Chart," Transportation Security 
Administration, http://www.Isa.gov/who_ we_are/org/editorial_multi_image_ with_table_0 102.shtm 
(accessed April 17, 2009) 
27 
Figure 3: Transportation Security Administration Organizational Structure108 
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This chart represents the administrative staff positions within the Transportation 
Security Administration. Professionals employed for the purpose of aviation security 
include: Transportation Security Officers, Federal Air Marshals, Federal Flight Deck 
Officers, Transportation Security Inspectors, and National Explosives Detection 
Canine Teams. 109 Transportation Security Officers are located at airport checkpoints 
to perform security screenings; they are the most visible to the public and represent 
the largest group of employees. 11° Federal Air Marshals serve as the primary law 
enforcement entity within TSA and they work closely with other law enforcement 
agencies to protect air travel. 111 Federal Flight Deck Officers are armed pilots, flight 
engineers, or navigators who have been trained to use firearms to defend against an 
108 lbid. 
109 Department of Homeland Security, "Law Enforcement." 
110 Department of Homeland Security, "Who We Are." 
111 Department of Homeland Security, "Law Enforcement." 
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act of criminal violence or air piracy attempting to gain control of an aircraft. 112 
Transportation Security Inspectors are dedicated to the oversight of air cargo.113 
These positions represent a multi-layered approach to securing commercial airliners 
from terrorist and criminal assault. 114 
The TSA uses layers of security to regulate the traveling public and the 
Nation's transportation system. 115 Security checkpoints in airports represent only one 
layer of security; others include intelligence gathering and analysis, checking 
passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches at airports, 
federal air marshals, federal flight deck officers and more security measures both 
visible and invisible to the public. 116 Each one of these layers alone is capable of 
stopping a terrorist attack; when combined, their security value is multiplied, creating 
a much stronger, formidable system. 117 According to the TSA, a terrorist who must 
overcome multiple security layers in order to carry out an attack is more likely to be 
pre-empted, deterred, or to fail during the attempt. 118 
112 
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Figure 4: TSA: 20 Layers of Security119 
20 Layers of Security 
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Each horizontal arrow represents a terrorist path and the vertical boxes represent the 
layers of security measures that must be penetrated before a terrorist can successfully 
execute an attack. The chart represents the difficulty presented to potential attackers 
by the multiple security measures implemented by the TSA. Each layer has the 
ability to prevent an attack on its own; therefore, multiple layers mean a greater 
h f · 120 c ance o prevention. 
Security measures implemented by the TSA include JOO percent screening of 




security inspections.121 Screening of baggage and passengers is also on the frontline 
of defense. Many of the security officers working for the TSA are now certified 
Behavior Detection Officers, which are trained security officers who screen travelers 
for involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people exhibit in response to 
a fear of being discovered. 122 Referral of Behavior Detection Officers for further 
screening is based on specific observed behaviors only, not on one's appearance, race, 
ethnicity or religion. 123 BDOs add an element of unpredictability to the security 
screening process; it is easy for passengers to navigate, but difficult for terrorists to 
manipulate and serves as an important additional layer of security in the airport 
environment requiring no additional specialized screening equipment.124 The TSA 
also uses employee screening through the use of background checks before 
employment and random inspections. 125 Another security measure is the Secure 
Flight program, which conducts uniform prescreening of passenger information 
against federal government watch lists for domestic and international flights. 126 
Despite the advances in security measures implemented by the Transportation 
Security Administration, many critics believe that several weaknesses in the system 
121 Department of Homeland Security, "Air Cargo." 
122 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Behavior Detection Officers," Transponation Security 
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still exist. Some critics argue that the ease in which airline and airport employees 
bypass security checkpoints when entering security areas is a major flaw in current 
policies.127 However, the TSA reports that a program that started in the fall of 2008 
deploys officers to inspect workers, their property, and their vehicles at any given 
time in any location. 128 This employee screening program is a step toward more 
secure airports and could eventually lead to full screening of all employees before 
they can enter secure locations. Another criticism is that checkpoint screening is not 
completely efficient due to breaches in security during GAO investigations. Kutz 
reported that a 2007 GAO report stated that "GAO investigators succeeded in passing 
through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several 
improvised explosive devices ... concealed in carry-on luggage and on passengers."129 
In order to determine the weaknesses in the security screening systems, the TSA has 
implemented on-going covert testing operations by highly trained covert testers. 130 
This system is intended to act as a measure of system-wide effectiveness and drive 
improvement through training. 131 The Transportation Security Administration states 
that the experts performing the covert tests know the system better than anyone and 
have the advantage of not being subject to TSA's 18 other layers of security 
potentially making them the most difficult to detect. 132 This covert testing ensures the 
continual improvement of the aviation security system. For example, some of the 
127 Kaplan, "Targets for Terrorists." 
128 
Department of Homeland Security, ''TSA Enhances Security with Employee Screening." 
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best practices developed as a result of covert testing; including, testing bomb kits at 
every checkpoint in the nation and enhanced scrutiny of shoes and other bulky 
clothing. 133 Kip Hawley, TSA Assistant Secretary, announced the success of 
Behavior Detection Officers during the screening process. 134 She stated that on April 
1, 2008, a Jamaica-bound passenger aroused the suspicion of BDOs, who, working in 
conjunction with the Orlando Police Department, the Orange County Bomb Squad, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, uncovered everything needed to make a 
bomb in the passenger's checked bag. 135 The Behavior Detection Officers, trained to 
detect deceptive and suspicious behavior, are contributing to airline security by 
detecting and discovering dangerous people and dangerous items. 136 Also, at 
Boston's Logan International Airport, Behavior Detection Officers, using behavioral 
cues, grew suspicious of a passenger who turned out to be carrying large, illegal 
amounts of prescription medication and a passport belonging to another person. 137 
The implementation of the Behavior Detection Officers Program is having great 
success and is an asset to airport security check points. These and other similar 
programs are bridging the gaps in security in the aviation industry and represent the 
success of current aviation security policies. 
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Aviation security policy has developed in response to criminal and terrorist 
attacks of the aviation industry. Each time an attack or breach of security occurs new 
policies have been created to deal with the new threats. Current aviation security 
policy is the responsibility of the Transportation Security Administration located 
within the Department of Homeland Security. It is their job to ensure safe passenger 
and cargo travel on all flights. Though many new and effective security procedures 
have been implemented it is important to note the flaws that still exist within the 
system in order to enhance security in the future. 
34 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TSA AND CBP 
The Transportation Security Administration and Customs and Border Patrol 
are responsible for facilitating the flow of travel and trade while protecting the U.S. 
from the threat of terrorism. There are four common administrative challenges that 
exist within both agencies: budget/fiscal, changing threats, structural barriers, and 
politics. 
Fiscal challenges come in the form of competition for funding and limitations 
on spending. Agencies must compete for program funding from Congress in order to 
ensure agency and program snrvival. According to "Terminating Public Programs" 
written by Mark Daniels, it is difficult to terminate a public program, but it can be 
accomplished if certain conditions are met. 138 To ensure survival, agencies must 
ensure funding, which creates competition among and between government agencies. 
When huge budget deficits and shrinkage of tax revenue exist it is financially 
imperative to reduce programs where it is politically possible. 139 This type of fiscal 
constraint leads to interagency conflict and resistance to cooperation since 
cooperative efforts have the potential to harm individual programs, prerogatives, and 
budgets. 140 Investing money into a cooperative program could potentially result in a 
loss of funding for a program specific to that agency leading to insufficient 
cooperation. Further, restrictions on funding make it difficult for agencies to 
138 
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implement programs in a timely fashion. Agencies are only allowed access to a 
quarter of their funds at a time in order to reduce the need for supplemental 
appropriations. 141 This can limit the flexibility to implement new programs in a 
timely manner, which is essential for security measures. New detection technologies 
are increasingly expensive, so limits on when funding can be spent delays the 
distribution of necessary resources to security agencies. Further, conflict and 
confusion with regard to the roles, missions, and authorities of counterterrorism 
organizations have led to the redundant efforts across the intelligence community 
have led to redundant efforts and inefficient use of limited resources. 142 
The most pressing fiscal issue is the lack of a budgetary theory that has the 
ability to evaluate what programs should be funded and those that should not. 143 
According to V.O. Key, the basic budgeting problem is determining: "on what basis 
shall it be decided to allocate x dollars to activity A instead of activity B?" This is 
another reason that agencies must compete with one another; they basically have to 
lobby for their programs by portraying them in the best possible light. This increases 
the chance that the budgetary process will be political instead of economic; budgeting 
decisions are made of the basis of "impressionistic judgment" and not on actual 
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standards of evaluation. 144 To rectify this misfortune, Key notes that "efforts to 
ascertain more precisely the relative values of public services" in determining the 
allocation of funds, is necessary. 145 Laurence O'Toole notes three aspects of 
intergovernmental relations: interdependency, bargaining, and complexity. 146 
Budgeting conflicts between agencies exhibit severe complexity. Many of these 
conflicts could be mitigated through extensive bargaining procedures that would 
allow for more efficient interdependent relationships which would serve as a step 
toward reducing an administrative barrier that inhibits security procedures. 
The second common administrative challenge is changing threats. The only 
constant is that there is always a threat from somewhere-whether it is domestic or 
foreign. Threats are constantly evolving and there is a "lag" between the time that the 
threat is discovered and when the solution to the threat can be implemented. 
Administrative and bureaucratic barriers place a burden on the implementation of 
security policy and prevention policies. This problem of efficiency lies in the fact 
that "government is different" from the private sector. 147 Government can be 
separated from all other institutions through the breadth of their scope, impact, and 
consideration; their public accountability; and their political character. 148 No other 
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other institution is so publicly accountable. 149 It must take into consideration multiple 
groups when implementing policy with the intent to do what is best for the most 
people. Government tends to be less efficient because of its public nature. 150 
The "lag" in response time can also be explained by the "red tape trap" which 
means that law enforcers and security personnel must work within the law while 
terrorists operate outside it. 151 This exposes them to legal and bureaucratic 
constraints that their criminal counterparts avoid. 152 Bureaucratic officials carry out 
their "daily activities within complex institutional frameworks that must obey 
constitutional law, criminal statutes, and bureaucratic regulations."153 Though these 
things limit the flexibility of bureaucratic institutions they are necessary in order to 
protect citizens' political rights and civil liberties and also to hold authorities 
accountable to law. 154 According to Michael Kenney, the legal and bureaucratic 
constraints are important to the functioning of liberal democratic states, but they 
provide an advantage to the enemy by delaying response time and increasing 
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The third common administrative challenge is politics. "Government is 
politics."
156 
"Some federal departments operate with relatively clear support from the 
general public in regard to the goals of their programs and policies," however, many 
do not.
157 
Program implementation must be balanced with controversy and 
conflicting values within society. 158 Currently, one such issue that the TSA is dealing 
with is the implementation of new passenger screening technology. 159 The new "full 
body scanners" are more invasive than current screening methods and critics argue 
that they are a violation of privacy. 160 Despite this 78% of respondents to a Gallup 
Poll stated that they would approve of the full-body scanners to improve security. 161 
Even so, this raises the question as to whether the trade-off between privacy and 
security can be justified as a policy choice. Another political trade-off is between the 
economy and security. Customs and Border Protection is implementing new border 
rules that require proof of citizenship from Canadian citizens, which was not 
previously required. 162 There are fears that this will impact those areas that depend 
on tourism, much of which comes from across the border. 163 Though this could have 
a negative impact on the economy, to ensure greater security they are necessary since 
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it is plausible that a terrorist could enter Canada due to more lenient restrictions and 
then cross the border into the U.S. without any barriers. There is a constant battle 
between security policy and other interests due to the restrictions frequently placed on 
people and actions. It is up to the people to decide the extent of the restriction they 
are willing to accept in order to ensure their own safety and the future of the nation. 
The fourth common administrative challenge can be classified as structural 
barriers. According to Donald Kettl, "homeland security involves so many different 
agencies performing so many different functions, that drawing clear lines is difficult. 
Figuring out how to make all the agencies work together is far harder."164 Agencies 
are structured organizations which operate under authority delegated from 
Congress. 165 Each agency has its' own job that it is required to do, and every person 
within the agency has an assigned task-bureaucracy is designed so that people do 
only their assigned job and stay out of the tasks of others.166 This instills the belief 
that collaborative efforts are not beneficial, required, or even allowed. This is a 
definite barrier since the "War on Terrorism" is a collaborative effort requiring the 
specialties of many different agencies in order to obtain the highest level of security 
possible. 
Mission conflicts pose another structural barrier to cooperative and 
collaborative efforts among agencies. A lack of "definitional clarity as to roles and 
responsibilities in the war on terrorism, and ongoing conflicts among key 




counterterrorism agencies, constitute an ongoing challenge."167 For example, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency are each focused 
on different intelligence information. 168 The FBI's mission is tracking and capturing 
criminals; while, the CIA is focused on tracking threats in foreign countries. The 
varying views and missions of the agencies contribute to a lack of communication 
and intelligence sharing between agencies. Homeland Security Specialist, Gregory F. 
Treverton, stated "it's no surprise that the FBI and CIA don't cooperate. We haven't 
wanted them to-until now." 169 Also, no agencies mission is solely based on 
homeland security; they each have other important missions which they are 
responsible for. A perfect example is Customs and Border Patrol which is also 
responsible for drug trafficking and immigration issues. 
Another structural barrier is varying agency cultures, which means that each 
agency is inherently different in the way it is organized and operates. 170 Already 
existing cultures can "blind employees to homeland security issues and make it 
difficult to incorporate homeland security into existing missions."171 For example, let 
us look at the FBI and CIA once again. The FBI has always had the duty to 
investigate crimes on American soil, and the CIA was forbidden from conducting 
167 WMD Report, 298. 





operations within the U.S. 172 For this reason the FBI feels that terrorism on U.S. soil 
falls within its jurisdiction and should be left alone by the CIA. 
Distinct agency culture, mission conflicts, and distance have led to technology 
gaps that result in a lack of interagency communication. First, all of the agencies that 
need to coordinate with one another-TSA, CBP, CIA, FBI, Coast Guard-are not 
1 d . l l . 113 ocate rn a centra ocat10n. They are spread out over a vast area so 
communication must be expertly coordinated through phone conferences and other 
technological means. Also, since each agency is different in culture it is also different 
with regard to technology. There is no standard database for intelligence collection 
and analysis and records are kept in many different forms. 174 To improve interagency 
sharing and cooperation technology upgrades would be necessary; however, these 
upgrades would require mass coordination and be extremely costly. To improve 
security these changes would probably be necessary since agency personnel generally 
do not have the time or means to stay in constant contact with other agencies. 
Finally, the last common structural problem is the difference between 
bureaucratic structure and the structure of terrorist networks. Bureaucratic 
institutions are organized in a hierarchical structure. 175 The principles of hierarchy 
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supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones."176 A rigid bureaucratic structure 
can impede the ability of security and law enforcement agencies to properly protect 
against threats. "Other things being equal, organizations with fewer participants, 
flatter authority structures, and decentralized decision rules tend to make decisions 
more rapidly than those that combine tall administrative hierarchies with centralized 
decision protocols."177 U.S. security and law enforcement agencies work in large 
bureaucracies that are oppressed by multiple layers of management and cumbersome 
decision protocols. 178 The TSA has more than 50,000 employees organized into 
numerous positions and divisions. The agency administrator oversees fourteen 
administrative divisions and each division is run by an assistant administrator who 
then oversees the different offices and units within their domain. 179 
Conversely, the terrorist networks are much smaller and organizationally 
flat. 180 Many terrorist and trafficking networks can be considered as "intergroup 
wheel or chain networks, with different nodes that p·erform specific tasks."181 
Specific cells frequently contain less than twelve members and even large wheel 
networks have fewer than a hundred people. 182 Each cell has a manager who 
supervises several workers and some networks contain assistant managers and cell 
managers may report to the network leader or to an intermediary; however, even the 
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largest networks contain no more than three or four management layers reducing the 
centralization effect. 183 Also, many cell managers have significant decision-making 
authority and some more loosely coupled chain networks composed of independent 
groups that coordinate their transactions in an informal manner generally containing a 
single manager and a handful of subordinates. 184 This flat structure allows for faster 
processing of information and decisions because information flows through fewer 
channels and limits information distortion because there are fewer managers to 
manipulate, misplace, or withhold information. 185 For example, a decision that could 
take two to three weeks to make their way through a bureaucratic chain of command 
can be made instantaneously in a network structure and disseminated to everyone in 
the chain of command within a single day. 186 These structural differences that exist 
between flatter network organizations and hierarchical bureaucratic organizations 
create a barrier for security and law enforcement officials that greatly hinder their 
ability to do their job. 
Despite the administrative barriers placed on Customs and Border Protection 
and the Transportation Security Administration, as well as the Department of 
Homeland Security as a whole, the security and intelligence agencies have made great 
strides in developing and implementing heightened security measures. It is difficult 






another major terrorist attack is nothing more than a lack of attempted attacks. To 
more fully evaluate the security procedures in place for passenger and cargo 
screening it would be necessary to implement frequent covert testing of the system 
which can identify vulnerabilities in the system. The TSA airport screening 
checkpoints are tested regularly, but continue to fail. In 2008, a TSA tester slipped 
through airport security with an artificial bomb disguised in an elastic back support 
brace, which he explained away by claiming he had a bad back. 187 The article stated 
that TSA screeners have a "soft spot" for passenger handicaps which could easily be 
exploited by terrorists.188 This type of testing needs to continue more frequently in 
order to identify weaknesses in the system and find needed solutions. However, these 
test procedures should not apply solely to passenger screening; they should be 
implemented for cargo shipments as well; otherwise the screening techniques for 
these items will fail to improve methods and procedures. 
Field research was conducted to examine the organizational and policy issues. 
A survey was developed and interviews conducted to develop qualitative data that 
contributed to the comparative analysis. However, as is often the case, further 
research in the areas of intelligence and security are hindered by the lack of 
information available to scholars. None-the-less, interviews were conducted with 
employees of the TSA and CBP; both agencies require all interviews to be conducted 
187 Jeanne Meserve and Mike M. Ahlers, "TSA tester slips mock bomb past airport security," Mon 




with a Public Relations Representative. A survey instrument with ten questions was 
designed and distributed via email to each agency after approval was obtained by the 
Morehead State University Institutional Review Board. The information obtained 
proved to be general information that is readily available and therefore provided 
limited results. Though limited, the ability of scholars to properly evaluate the 
intelligence community and offer sufficient solutions to administrative and 
organizational problems requires this type of structured engagement for development 
of data. 189 
The TSA and CBP, along with all other members of the intelligence 
community, must improve intelligence collection and sharing techniques. The CBP is 
currently working to become a fully integrated member of the intelligence community 
by transforming their approach to border security and enforcement through the use of 
advanced information, intelligence-driven planning, strategically placed tactical 
infrastructure, and technology to secure airspace, maritime, and physical borders. 190 
CBP' s effort to become part of the intelligence community is a significant step in this 
direction; however, it is also necessary that coordination of intelligence sharing be 
taken to the next level. The Office of National Intelligence (ONI) was created to help 
combat this problem, but according to the WMD Report the ONI needs to implement 
some needed improvements. The Director of the ONI should implement a 
management structure that coordinates and "end-to-end" collection enterprise that 
189 See Appendix A for the instrument and qualitative data. 
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brings together members of different intelligence agencies to work together on a 
single project instead of having redundant findings and bringing together different 
pieces of the puzzle. 191 
191 WMD Report, 319. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The increasing complexity of the security environment, due to changing threats, 
advancing technology, and the growing interconnectedness between countries, has 
created a more difficult task for homeland security agencies. The Transportation 
Security Administration and Customs and Border Patrol were restructured in the 
aftermath of 9/1 1 as part of the largest restructuring of the federal government. These 
agencies, responsible for the efficient flow of trade and travel, have made great 
strides in their transformation into anti-terrorism agencies, but deficiencies continue 
to exist due to administrative issues that are much out of their control. The four 
common administrative challenges that found within both agencies fall into the areas 
of fiscal challenges, changing threats, structural barriers, and politics. Bureaucratic 
characteristics severely limit the ability of large organizations to adapt easily to 
changing threats and to quickly respond to a new security threat. Some of the 
administrative characteristics-lack of interagency communication----could be 
reduced with a few major changes that focus on cooperative efforts and more 
effective communication methods. 
The intelligence and security community would benefit from an analysis of 
the organizational structure of all agencies dealing with homeland security and 
intelligence collection in order to uncover more overlapping issues and potentially 
create a system for the implementation of policies that would mitigate the gaps in 
security. Though many improvements have been made, the intelligence and security 
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community has a significant amount of work left to do in order to secure the U.S. 




1. Tell me about your job and how it has changed in the last decade. 
2. What can you tell me about Explosive Trace Detection Technology? How does it 
work? What is the timeline on its implementation? How accurate is the technology? 
How cost effective is this technology? What is the cost to security to not use the 
technology? 
3. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what can you tell me about the full body 
scanners? 
4. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security procedures are in place for 
air cargo? 
5. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security weaknesses exist in the 
passenger and cargo screening process? 
6. What is the greatest security threat at this time? 
7. What advancements have been made in the area of biometric technology? 
8. What are the barriers to implementing security technology? 
9. The SAFE Port Act calls for 100% of container scanning at foreign ports by the 
year 2012, what is the status of this policy? 
10. What issues inhibit the sharing of intelligence information? 
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CBP Answers 
1. Tell me about your job and how it has changed in the last decade. 
No response provided. 
2. What can you tell me about Explosive Trace Detection Technology? How does it 
work? What is the timeline on its implementation? How accurate is the technology? 
How cost effective is this technology? What is the cost to security to not use the 
technology? 
No response provided. 
3. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what can you tell me about the full 
body/ cargo scanners? 
No response provided. 
4. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security procedures are in place for 
cargo shipped by air and sea? 
No response provided. 
5. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security weaknesses exist in the 
passenger and cargo screening process? 
No response provided. 
6. What is the greatest security threat at this time? 
Security threats change so frequently it is difficult to pick one as the "greatest threat". 
7. What advancements have been made in the area of biometric technology? 
Through the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Congress 
established an expectation that DHS would use biometrics as part of the entry process 
to biometrically compare and authenticate visa or other travel or entry document 
issued by DHS or the Department of State. The equipment and software that will 
enable DHS to biometrically compare and authenticate these documents has been 
deployed to the ports of entry since October 2005. 
US-VISIT records biographic and biometric information to conduct security checks 
and verify the identities of international travelers applying for admission into the 
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United States. By linking a person's biometric information to his or her travel 
documents reduces the risk that a traveler's identity or documents could be 
intentionally misused by someone attempting to gain entry into the United States. 
The US-VISIT program currently checks a visitor's fingerprints against DHS records 
of immigration violators and Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) records of 
criminals and known or suspected terrorists. Checking biometrics against the watch 
list helps officers make visa determinations and admissibility decisions. Collecting 10 
fingerprints also improves fingerprint matching accuracy and the department's ability 
to compare a visitor's fingerprints against latent fingerprints collected by Department 
of Defense (DOD) and the FBI from known and unknown terrorists all over the 
world. Additionally, visitors' fingerprints are checked against the FBI's Criminal 
Master File. 
8. What are the barriers to implementing security technology? 
No response provided 
9. The SAFE Port Act calls for 100% of container scanning at foreign ports by the 
year 2012, what is the status of this policy? 
CBP is committed to securing the global supply chain through a risk-management 
based, layered enforcement approach, an effort that includes advance information, 
sophisticated technology and partnerships with the trade community and other 
countries. 
Following cargo scanning deployments to several foreign seaports, CBP will focus 
future scanning deployments on high-risk trade corridors, which represent the greatest 
threats to the U.S. Prioritizing deployments in this way will maximize the security 
benefits with the resources provided. 
CBP met the legislative requirement to establish a 100% scanning pilot program in 
three locations and went beyond the legislative mandate by deploying the Secure 
Freight Initiative (SFI) at a total of six ports including: Port Qasim, Pakistan; Puerto 
Cortes, Honduras; Southampton, United Kingdom; Modern Terminal, Hong Kong; 
Gamman Terminal, Busan, Korea; and the Port of Salalah, Oman. 
SFI Division is currently negotiating the deployment of scanning operations with 
Hutchison Port Holdings, Karachi International Container Terminal (KICT) and 
Pakistan International Container Terminal (PICT). CBP has purchased two NII 
systems (SAIC P-7500) for the SFI deployments to the Port of Karachi. 
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CBP is currently negotiating with the Government of Egypt to deploy scanning 
operations to the Port of Alexandria. In August 2009, CBP Officials traveled to 
Egypt to present the Egyptian Government with a copy of the MOU which was 
translated into Arabic for their review. 
The expansion of scanning operations to the Ports of Karachi, Pakistan and 
Alexandria, Egypt fits within the Department of Homeland Security's strategy to 
deploy SFI scanning operations to locations of strategic importance. These ports are 
among the top scoring ports for risk when considering A TS scores, intelligence 
reports, and USCG assessments. 
CBP has met the SAFE Port Act pilot requirement. SFI is fully operational and is 
currently scanning 100% of U.S. bound containers laden in: 
Port Qasim (Pakistan) - Fully operational on October 12, 2007 
- Of the 86,442 containers scanned to date, 450 
have alarmed (1% of total scanned) 
Puerto Cortes (Honduras) - Fully operational on October 12, 2007 
- Of the 141,285 containers scanned to date, 
1,115 have alarmed (1% of total scanned) 
Southampton (U.K.) - Fully operational on October 12, 2007 
- Of the 24,285 containers scanned to date, 
1,287 have alarmed (5% of total scanned) 
10. What issues i11hibit the shari11g of i11tellige11ce illformatio11? 
No response provided. 
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TSA Interview Responses 
1. Tell me about your job and how it has changed in the last decade. 
No response provided 
2. What can you tell me about Explosive Trace Detection Technology? How does it 
work? What is the timeline on its implementation? How accurate is the 
technology? How cost effective is this technology? What is the cost to security to 
not use the technology? 
TSA used explosive trace detection (ETD) technology at security checkpoints around 
the country to screen carry-on baggage and to screen passengers for explosives in 
secondary screening. Earlier this year, TSA is expanded the random use of ETD 
technology in airports as part of our layered approach to aviation security and to keep 
passengers safe. Officers may swab a piece of luggage or passenger hands and then 
ETD technology to test for explosives. The swab is then placed inside the ETD unit 
which analyzes the content for the presence of potential explosive residue. ETD units 
cost approximately $45k each. 
3. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what can you tell me about the full body 
scanners? 
TSA's job is to keep the traveling public safe and the use of advanced imaging 
technology is critical to mitigate known and evolving threats. Since 9/11, Congress 
has mandated that TSA invest in technologies to strengthen the efficiency and 
security of aviation. Imaging technology is an integral part of that effort. 
Imaging technologies safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats 
including weapons, explosives and other objects concealed under layers of clothing 
without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe. Advanced 
imaging technology is optional to all passengers. Those who opt out may request 
alternative screening at the checkpoint, to include a physical pat-down. 
TSA plans to install 450 AIT units throughout U.S. airports during 2010 and nearly 
1000 through 2011. 
More information is available at 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/imaging_technology.shtm 
4. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security procedures are in place for 
air cargo? 
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TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of all modes of transportation, including 
cargo placed aboard airplanes and particularly focuses on passenger-carrying planes. 
TSA worked closely with Congress for more than six months to significantly 
strengthen security in air cargo through the 9/11 Bill, which was signed into law on 
August 3, 2007. TSA has met the mandates of the law to date and currently 50 
percent of air cargo on passenger carrying aircraft is screened. One hundred percent 
of the cargo on 96 percent of the flights originating in the United States is now 
screened. Eighty-five percent of the passengers flying each day from U.S. airports are 
on planes where all of the cargo has been fully screened. 
One step in achieving 100 percent screening is the requirement for all airlines 
operating narrow body passenger aircraft from U.S. airports to screen I 00 percent of 
cargo transported on them. 
By working with air carriers and members of the air cargo community, we began 
screening 100 percent of cargo transported on narrow-body (single-aisle) aircraft. 
TSA achieved this milestone in October 2008 - a full 22 months before the deadline. 
TSA already has in place a multi-layered, high-tech, industry-cooperative approach, 
utilizing surprise cargo security inspections called "strikes," covert testing, security 
directives and 100 percent screening at 250 smaller airports. 1n 2008, TSA eliminated 
all exemptions to screening of air cargo for the first time and increased the amount of 
cargo which is subject to mandatory screening. 
With TSA's new air cargo regulation, TSA will be doing 100,000 more background 
checks, specifically on cargo employees who screen cargo and/or have knowledge of 
how it is going to be transported or actually transport the cargo. The rule requires 
more robust checks and more visibility on the shipping companies and their 
employees. Additionally, we have extended security areas at the airport to include air 
cargo areas. 
5. In your view, as you are allowed to say, what security weaknesses exist in the 
passenger and cargo screening process? 
No response provided 
6. What is the greatest security threat at this time? 
No response provided 
7. What advancements have been made in the area of biometric technology? 
No response provided 
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8. What are the barriers to implementing security technology? 
No response provided 
9. The SAFE Port Act calls for 100% of container scanning at foreign ports by the 
year 2012, what is the status of this policy? 
No response provided 
10. What issues inhibit the sharing of intelligence information? 
No response provided 
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